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The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999: 
Should Congress Broaden Antitrust Exemptions? 
Ingrid Winfrey* 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE HEALTH CARE DEBATE 
The healthcare market is vastly different now as compared to the 
late 1980s.1 In the last five years, scholars, politicians, and citizens 
have debated health care issues.2 It was even a central issue in the last 
presidential election.3 The introduction of managed care 
organizations (MCOs) and concerns that health care is too expensive 
cause physicians to believe that they have little control over their 
practices.4  
Congressman Tom Campbell’s belief that MCOs have too much 
leverage over health care providers prompted him to introduce into 
Congress a bill entitled The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 
 
 * J.D., Washington University School of Law, 2001. 
 1. Jeremy Lutsky, Is Your Physician Becoming a Teamster: the Rising Trend of 
Physicians Joining Labor Unions in the Late 1990’s, 2 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 55 (1997). 
 2. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S18324 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991); 138 CONG. REC. E. 
(daily ed. Oct. 9, 1992); Matthew Cooper, The Selling of the President’s Health Care 
Proposals, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 1993, at 29. 
 3. Joseph P. Shapiro, Giving Doctor’s the Final Word, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Nov. 22, 1999, at 20, 20-24. 
 4. Lutsky, supra note 1, at 55. “Today the health care industry is controlled not by the 
physician, but by large insurance companies, health maintenance organizations (HMO’s), 
physician practice management companies and for-profit corporations.” Id. A journalist stated: 
The merciless erosion of medical decision making capability and professional 
influence has resulted in a sense of untold frustration and hopelessness [among 
physicians]. This dawning of physician discontent has provided the intellectual fodder 
for the revival and popularity of unionism as a proactive strategy to right the wrongs of 
this era and return the economic and power leverage to physicians. 
Id. at 55-56 (citing Joseph L. Murphy, Physician Unions: Bane or Balm? CHI. MED., Aug. 21, 
1997, at 1,2); see also, Francis J. Serbaroli, When Physicians Try to Unionize Against HMO’s, 
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 30, 1998, at 3, 7; Independent Doctors Seek Right to Organize, Yet Refuse to 
Consider Work Stoppages, BNA HEALTH CARE POL’Y REP., June 1998. 
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1999 (Health Care Act).5 In summary, the Health Care Act provides 
that health care professionals engaged in negotiations with health 
plans regarding contract terms may enjoy the antitrust exemptions to 
which labor unions are entitled in collective bargaining. The 
limitation is that health care professionals are not entitled to 
participate in a “collective cessation” or strike of any service to 
patients.6 
A mixture of congressional and judicial action created the current 
antitrust exemptions. Neither branch created broad, sweeping 
exemptions. Therefore, in order to maintain an effective antitrust law, 
Congress should not now create an exemption for physicians who 
have other means of protecting themselves in the market than through 
antitrust exemptions. 
This Note shows that an antitrust exemption for physicians is 
contrary to labor policy, antitrust policy, and public policy. Part II of 
this Note explores the creation of the labor exemption and other 
exemptions created or rejected by the judiciary and Congress. Part III 
 
 5. Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999, H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999).  
 6. In pertinent part:  
Sec. 3. Application of the Antitrust Laws to Health Care Professionals Negotiating 
with Health Plans. 
 (a) In General.—Any health care professionals who are engaged in negotiations 
with a health plan regarding the terms of any contract under which the professionals 
provide health care items or services for which benefits are provided under such plan 
shall, in connection with such negotiations, be entitled to the same treatment under the 
antitrust laws as the treatment to which bargaining units which are recognized under 
the National Labor Relations Act are entitled in connection with such collective 
bargaining. Such a professional shall, only in connection with such negotiations, be 
treated as an employee engaged in concerted activities and shall not be regarded as 
having the status of an employer, independent contractor, managerial employee, or 
supervisor. 
 (c) Limitation.—The exemption provided in subsection (a) shall not confer any right 
to participate in the collective cessation of service to patients not otherwise permitted 
by law. 
 (d) Definitions.—For purposes of this section: 
 (3) Health Care Professional.—The term “health care professional” means an 
individual who provides health care items or services, treatment, assistance with 
activities of daily living, or medications to patients and who, to the extent required by 
State or Federal law, possesses specialized training that confers expertise in the 
provision of such items or services, treatment, assistance, or medications. 
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/17
p445 note Winfrey book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999 447 
 
 
provides a summary of physicians’ current relationship with MCOs, a 
brief overview of the current ability of physicians to unionize, and the 
opposing theories behind the Health Care Act. Finally, Part IV 
analyzes the Health Care Act in light of the policies underlying the 
antitrust law and the exceptions to the antitrust law. This analysis 
shows that the Health Care Act is not the proper way to eliminate 
physician complaints against MCOs or to increase the quality of 
patient care. Part V further presents a proposal for the adoption of the 
Patient Bill of Rights, rather than the Health Care Act. 
II. THE CREATION OF THE LABOR EXEMPTION  
Unions began in a time when employees had no rights.7 
Employers forced their employees to work grudging hours, subjected 
them to horrific working conditions, and paid them nominal wages.8 
Through unions, these employees eventually negotiated with the 
employers to obtain reasonable working hours, clean working 
environments, and livable wages.9 
A. The Early Years 
Since the early 1800s, courts struggled over employee’s use of 
concerted activity and generally ruled against the employees in one 
manner or another.10 When Congress enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust 
 
 7. KENNETH A. KOVACH, PRACTICAL LABOR RELATIONS 3 (1986) (“For the first 150 
years of this country’s independence, the American worker was free politically, but a virtual 
slave industrially.”). President Cleveland summarized America’s situation: 
As we view the achievements of aggregated capital, we discover the existence of 
trusts, combinations, and monopolies, while the citizen is struggling far in the rear or is 
trampled to death beneath an iron heel. Corporations, which should be the carefully 
restrained creatures of the law and the servants of the people, are fast becoming the 
people’s masters. 
Elinor R. Hoffman, Labor and Antitrust Policy: Drawing a Line of Demarcation, 50 BROOK. L. 
REV. 1, 12-13 (1983). 
 8. The management practices of companies subjected the workers to inflated prices for 
company owned housing, water supplies and stores, unsafe and unhealthy working conditions, 
long work weeks, extremely low wages, and arbitrary employment and personnel practices. 
KOVACH, supra note 7, at 3. The company even had its own police force. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See Commonwealth v. Pullis, Phila. Mayor’s Ct. (1803), reprinted in A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 59-248 (John R. Commons et al. 
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Act (Sherman Act),11 declaring monopolistic activity illegal, the court 
found a more flexible means of ruling against unions. The Sherman 
Act marks the beginning of a long conflict between the federal 
judiciary and the legislature. In Loewe v. Lawler,12 the court struck 
down actions of a union as interfering with the employer’s trade in 
contravention of the Sherman Act.13  
In response, the legislature mandated a less strict approach in the 
Clayton Act.14 Although the legislature appeared to give more 
 
eds., 1958) (1910-11); See also Commonwealth v. Hunt, 38 Am. Dec. 346 (Mass. 1842) 
(abandoning criminal penalties to use civil penalties where the employees have an “illegal 
purpose” or use “illegal means”). 
 11. The Sherman Act provides: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is 
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any 
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a 
felony . . . 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
 12. 208 U.S. 274 (1907). 
 13. A primary and secondary boycott by employees interferes with the employer’s trade 
and is a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 303-04; see also E. States Lumber Dealers Ass’n v. 
United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1913) (holding use of a black list to influence retailers to refrain 
from dealing with listed wholesalers constitutes a violation of the antitrust act). 
 14. The Clayton Act provides:  
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing 
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation 
of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for purposes of mutual 
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain 
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate 
objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or 
construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the 
antitrust laws.  
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1999). The Clayton Act further provides: 
That no restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United 
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and 
employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between 
persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of a 
dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent 
irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the 
application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or 
property right must be described with particularity . . . . And no such restraining order 
or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from 
terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any work or labor 
or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or 
from attending at any place where any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the 
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freedom to labor unions by mandating that the antitrust laws were not 
to be interpreted as forbidding unions entirely or as forbidding unions 
from lawfully carrying out their legitimate objects, the judiciary 
refused to interpret the Sherman Act more liberally. In fact, the Court 
continued to find labor activity illegal under the Sherman Act. In 
Duplex Printing Press, Co. v. Deering ,15 the Court held that § 20 of 
the Clayton Act does not exempt a union from liability under the 
Sherman Act.16  
B. The Legislature Takes Control 
Although the Court relented on antitrust exemptions in general, it 
continued to find against labor unions until the legislature intervened. 
In 1921, the Court rejected antitrust protection for unions, but created 
 
purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully 
persuading any person to work or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to 
patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or 
persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, 
or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other 
moneys or things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for 
lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in 
absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall nay of the acts specified in this 
paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.  
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1994). 
 15. 254 U.S. 443 (1921). A secondary boycott is not a legitimate object of a union. Id. at 
474-79. 
 16. Essentially, the Court held that it may withdraw the shield of Clayton Act 
protection where it deems the union’s object “illegitimate.” The Court narrowed the scope 
of normal union activities to those involving the employees and the primary employer. 
Where the union affects “innocent people” who are remote from the original dispute, the 
union will not be given protection from liability under the Clayton Act. Id. at 477-78. The 
Court states: 
Section 20 must be given full effect according to its terms as an expression of the 
purpose of Congress; but it must be borne in mind that the section imposes an 
exceptional and extraordinary restriction upon the equity powers of the courts of the 
United States and upon the general operation of the anti-trust laws . . . [A broad 
reading of Section 20] would virtually repeal by implication the prohibition of the 
Sherman Act, so far as labor organizations are concerned . . . [giving unions] a control 
over commerce among the States that is denied to the governments of the States 
themselves.  
Id. at 471-73. The dissent argued that the Clayton Act was designed to equalize the positions of 
workingmen and employers as industrial combatants with respect to the law. Id. at 484.  
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an antitrust exemption for major league baseball.17 The judiciary did, 
however, limit the baseball exemption by refusing to extend its 
application to any other sport or to the entertainment industry.18  
Following Coronado Coal, the legislature enacted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act that declared the “public policy of the United States” 
mandates that workers have the right to organized representation.19 
 
 17. See Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925) (holding that a 
union’s intent to restrain or control the interstate market is enough to predicate a Sherman Act 
violation). In Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 
(1922), the court held that baseball was not subject to antitrust laws because the transport of 
players across state lines was merely incident to the exhibition of the games. Id. at 208. 
 18. The baseball exemption created controversy in the years following, but the Court 
determined that the exemption was one for the legislature to cure, not the judiciary. See Toolson 
v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). The Court held that more harm than good 
would come from overruling the exemption created in the twenties because baseball made 
substantial changes with great cost when the Court handed down the Federal Baseball decision. 
Id. at 357. It based its decision on two factors. First, Congress was aware of the rule for thirty 
years and had not promulgated legislation changing it. Id. Second, the business of baseball 
developed for thirty years under the knowledge that it was not subject to antitrust laws. Id. 
Thus, the Court concluded that the choice was one for the legislature. The legislature and the 
court refused to extend the baseball exemption to other organized sports and exhibition 
businesses. In 1951, four separate bills that would exempt other organized professional sports 
were introduced into Congress; however, none were passed. See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 
445, 450 n.7 (1957). In 1955, the judiciary confronted exhibition businesses in United States v. 
Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1955), and sports other than baseball in United States v. International 
Boxing, 348 U.S. 236 (1955), to determine that the baseball exemption should not be extended 
to these businesses. In Shubert, the Court based its decision on the Toolson factors holding that 
the judiciary should not provide other businesses the exemption because they do not have the 
same background; that the decision to extend the baseball exemption to other business was for 
the legislature. Shubert, 348 U.S. at 230. In International Boxing, the Court decided that it was 
a question for the legislature since it is a question of granting, instead of extending, the Federal 
Baseball exemption. Shubert, 348 U.S. at 243-44; see also Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 
(1957) (stating that more likely than not, were baseball to be decided “on a clean slate,” it 
would be decided differently, so other sports will not be given the exemption); Haywood v. 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 401 U.S. 1204, 1205 (1971) (declaring that “[b]asketball . . . does not 
enjoy exemption from the antitrust laws”).  
 In 1998, Congress acted on the suggestion of the Supreme Court and revoked a portion of 
the baseball antitrust exemption by amendment to the Clayton Act, providing: 
[T]he conduct, acts, practices, or agreements of persons in the business of organized 
professional major league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of 
major league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level are subject to 
antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts, practices, or agreements would be 
subject to the antitrust laws if engaged by persons in any other professional sports 
business affecting interstate commerce. 
The Curt Flood Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. § 27(a) (Supp. V. 1999). 
 19. The Norris-LaGuardia Act provides: 
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Three years later, the legislature stepped in as the primary labor 
policymaker by promulgating the Wagner Act, commonly known as 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),20 explicitly giving 
employees the right to join labor unions.21 The NLRA22 is the 
primary statute regulating labor relations and collective bargaining.23 
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the administrative 
agency in charge of regulating labor unions.24 The purpose of the 
NLRA is to promote collective bargaining and balance the power 
between employees and employers.25 It regulates the relations 
between employees and employers and only considers the interests of 
third parties in situations involving industrial strife caused by 
unregulated, economic warfare between parties in labor disputes that 
 
Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of 
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate and other 
forms of ownership association, the individual unorganized worker is commonly 
helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labor, and 
thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, though 
he should be free to decline to associate with his fellows, it is necessary that he have 
full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his 
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he 
shall be free from . . . interference . . . of employers . . . in the designation of such 
representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.  
The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1994) (emphasis added). 
 20. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).  
 21. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994). The National Labor Relations Act addresses: 
[t]he inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full 
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized 
in the corporate or other forms of ownership association.  
Id. It provides, in pertinent part: 
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, 
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of 
such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement 
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as 
authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title. 
Id. § 151(1). 
 23. See WILLIAM B. GOULD, IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 26 (3d ed. 1993). 
 24. See Lutsky, supra note 1, at 55, 63. 
 25. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994) (describing the findings and policies behind the NLRA). 
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occurred prior to the passage of the NLRA.26 
The NLRA creates an obligation between both the employer and 
the representative of employees to bargain collectively.27 However, it 
does not create an obligation on either party to agree to the other’s 
proposal or to make concessions.28 Because an employer must only 
 
 26. John J. Deis, Comment, The Unionization of Independent Contracting Physicians: A 
Comedy of Errors, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 951, 962 (1999); see also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994) (making 
no mention of the rights of third parties). 
 27. The NLRA gives general guidelines for determining what constitutes an employee: 
The term “employee” shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer . . . and shall include any individual whose work 
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or 
because of any unfair labor practice . . . but shall not include any individual having the 
status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a supervisor.  
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994). Although the NLRA explicitly rejects independent contractors from 
employee status, many cases have found that other types of workers, generally considered 
independent contractors, were employees deserving protection of the NLRA. See, e.g., 
Roadway Package Sys., 288 NLRB 196 (1988) (finding truck drivers to qualify as employees 
because of the amount of control exercised by the employer over the driver’s routine and the 
driver’s lack of entrepreneurial freedom); Blackberry Creek Trucking, 291 NLRB 474, 480 
(1988) (finding truck drivers to qualify as employees based upon employer disciplinary rules 
and prohibitions); Am. Fed’n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968) (holding musicians 
deserve protection of the NLRA); Home Box Office v. Dir. Guild of Am., 531 F. Supp. 578 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (screen directors are entitled to protection of the NLRA). A supervisor is 
defined as: 
. . . any individual having the authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, 
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other 
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to 
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such 
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of 
independent judgment.  
29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Collective bargaining is defined as: 
[t]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of 
the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994); see also, Lutsky, supra note 1, at 63-64 (The act “creates a legally 
enforceable right for employees to organize, requires employers to bargain with employees 
through employee elected representatives, and gives employees the right to engage in concerted 
activities for collective bargaining purposes or other mutual aid or protection.”). 
 28. Deis, supra note 26, at 963; see also NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 
(1952). Once a demand is made, the opposing party must make a counter proposal, but that 
proposal may be the existing wages and working conditions. Deis, supra note 26, at 963 n.84; 
see also NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943) (holding 
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engage in “good faith” discussions with the union, the union’s ability 
to obtain requested terms depends largely upon its economic power.29 
The NLRA, as construed by the judiciary, contains three 
categories of bargaining: mandatory subjects, permissive subjects, 
and precluded subjects.30 Mandatory subjects of bargaining are 
contractual terms that require bargaining under § 8(a)(5) of the 
NLRA and include wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment.31  
Five years after the passage of the NLRA, the Court appeared to 
retreat from the fight against the legislature.32 In Apex Hosiery v. 
Leader,33 the Court limited union liability under the Sherman Act. 
The Court noted that the Sherman Act was not aimed at interstate 
transportation of goods, but at eliminating “trusts” and 
“combinations” of businesses that controlled the market by 
suppression of competition.34 The Court concluded that restraints on 
transportation in interstate commerce are not violative of the 
Sherman Act unless they are intended to have, or in fact have, direct 
effects on the market.35 In United States v. Hutcheson,36 the Court 
 
employer must “participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to 
find a basis for agreement”). 
 29. Deis, supra note 26, at 963; see also NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 
488-89 (1960) (“The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on 
occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system . . . .”); NLRB v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 
343 U.S. 395 (1952) (holding the NLRB “may not, either directly or indirectly, compel 
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining 
agreements”). 
 30. See GOULD, supra note 23, at 105-07 (1993); see also NLRB v. Wooster Division of 
Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958) (stating terms of a contract fall into three categories: 
illegal subjects, mandatory subjects, and voluntary subjects). 
 31. GOULD, supra note 23, at 107 (examining the holding of Borg-Warner). The NLRB 
examines practices on a case by case basis to determine what constitutes a term and condition 
of employment. See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 494-95 (1979). Some 
considerations are whether the practice is germane to the workplace, whether the practice 
involves a managerial decision at the heart of entrepreneurial control, and whether it is general 
industry practice. Id. at 498-501. 
 32. See infra text accompanying notes 33-39. 
 33. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
 34. The Court excused its prior application of the antitrust law by stating that in all cases 
where it previously applied the Sherman Act to unions, the activities affecting interstate 
commerce were “directed at control of the market and were so widespread as substantially to 
affect it.” Id. at 506. 
 35. Id. at 510-11. The Sherman Act was not intended to apply to restraints that “fall short, 
both in purpose and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity.” Id. at 512. In 
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created the “judicial exemption” which relied on the spirit of the 
labor statutes to protect labor unions from federal court interference 
when the union is carrying out its lawful objectives.37 Through the 
blending of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 
Hutcheson defined the statutory immunity from antitrust laws for 
unilateral labor union conduct.38 This non-statutory prong of the labor 
exemption eventually allowed groups previously included in antitrust 
prosecutions to unite and form unions.39 
 
dictum the Court stated: 
Since, in order to render a labor combination effective it must eliminate the 
competition from non-union made goods . . . an elimination of price competition based 
on differences in labor standards is the objective of any national labor organization. 
But this effect on competition has not been considered to be the kind of curtailment of 
price competition prohibited by the Sherman Act.  
Id. at 503-04. Chief Justice Hughes filed a strong dissent arguing that the activities by the union 
were a direct and intentional prevention of interstate commerce. Id. at 514. 
 36. 312 U.S. 219 (1941). The Court held a peaceful attempt by union members to 
convince other unions to refuse to work for an employer was plainly authorized by the Clayton 
Act. Id. at 232. 
 37. The Court stated: 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act removed the fetters upon trade union activities, which 
according to judicial construction § 20 of the Clayton Act had left untouched, by still 
further narrowing the circumstances under which the federal courts could grant 
injunctions in labor disputes. More especially, the Act explicitly formulated the ‘public 
policy of the United States’ in regard to the industrial conflict, and by its light 
established that the allowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had 
been in the Duplex case, to an immediate employer-employee relation. Therefore, 
whether trade union conduct constitutes a violation of the Sherman Law is to be 
determined only by reading the Sherman Law and § 20 of the Clayton Act and the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act as a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor conduct.  
Id. at 231. 
 38. Justice Frankfurter stated in Hutcheson: 
So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, 
the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment 
regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or 
unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means. 
Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232; see also Deis, supra note 26, at 955; Hoffman, supra note 7, at 25. 
 39. See generally Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(applying the non-statutory antitrust exemption to basketball); Mackey v. Nat’l Football 
League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (applying the non-statutory antitrust exemption to 
football). So long as employees are bargaining through their union with an employer over such 
terms of employment as wages or working conditions, and the effect on the market is only 
incidental, the non-statutory labor exemption will apply to the agreement. Connell Construction 
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622-35 (1975). 
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C. The Court Narrows the Exemption 
Unions enjoyed substantial growth between 1941 and 1945, but in 
1945 the Court reined in the judicial labor exemption. In Allen 
Bradley v. IBEW,40 the Court held that where the union enters into a 
bargaining agreement with third parties and where such agreement 
restricts the market, the Hutcheson exemption does not apply.41 Two 
years later, the legislature enacted the Taft-Hartley Act, which 
codified Allen-Bradley.42 The Taft-Hartley Act prohibited unions 
from engaging in specific activities such as secondary boycotts, 
jurisdictional strikes over work assignments, and strikes to force an 
employer to fire a person because of his or her union affiliation or 
lack thereof.43 
The Taft-Hartley Act did not end the controversy over the labor 
exemption. Two cases decided in 1965 showed the Court’s division 
over what course the labor exemption should take. In United Mine 
Workers v. Pennington,44 a plurality held that a multi-employer 
bargaining agreement that sets product prices is not exempt from 
antitrust laws.45 Further, the Hutcheson exemption is lost when the 
union colludes with an employer to drive smaller operators out of the 
market.46 However, Justice White approved of an exemption for 
 
 40. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).  
 41. Id. at 811. The Court stated that the intricate “program in which contractors and 
manufacturers united with one another to monopolize all the business in New York City, to bar 
all other business from that area, and to charge the public prices above a competitive level” was 
“a violation of the Act . . . .” Id. at 809, 811. 
 42. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act § 120), 29 U.S.C. § 141 
(2000). 
 43. Id. § 158(b)(4). 
 44. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  
 45. Id. at 662. The Court split three ways. Justice White wrote the opinion for the Court 
joined by Chief Justice Warner and Justice Brennan. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate 
opinion joined by Justice Black and Justice Clark differing from the Court’s opinion only in the 
amount of evidence necessary for a prima facie case. Id. at 674-75. Justice Goldberg wrote a 
separate opinion for the dissent joined by Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart arguing that Apex 
and Hutcheson showed an intent to immunize collective bargaining over mandatory subjects. 
The dissent also argued the Court’s opinion would cause underground conversations or cause 
the union to resort to strikes for higher wages because the Court’s willingness to infer a 
prohibited agreement from union conduct. Id. at 676. 
 46. Id. at 663. Justice White acknowledged the Apex holding that agreements on wages 
may have an effect on the product market without being subject to the Sherman Act. Id. at 664-
66. However, Justice White warned: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p445 note Winfrey book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
456 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 8:445 
 
 
multi-employer bargaining over wages to be paid by the multi-
employer group’s members since the restraint on the market relates to 
the elimination of wage competition which is not proscribed by the 
Sherman Act.47 Even this exemption can be lost if a union agrees 
with a group of employers to impose a wage scale on other 
employers.  
In Amalgamated Meatcutters and Butchers Workmen v. Jewel Tea 
Co.,48 the Court held that an agreement between the union and an 
employer regarding hours of work is subject to the antitrust 
exemption.49 The Court developed a test for the antitrust exemption: a 
restraint on the commercial market must be no greater than necessary 
to preserve the union’s legitimate interests in wages, hours, and 
working conditions.50 Many questions remained following 
Pennington and Jewel Tea, but the Court left them unanswered for 
another decade. 
 
This is not to say that an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations is 
automatically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations 
involve a compulsory subject of bargaining. . . . One group of employers may not 
conspire to eliminate competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the 
employers if it becomes a party to the conspiracy. 
Id.  
 47. Id. at 664. 
 48. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). The Justices were divided into the same groups as in 
Pennington. Cf. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).  
 49. 381 U.S. at 691. The Court stated: 
[T]he issue in this case is whether the marketing-hour restriction, like wages, and 
unlike prices, is so intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the 
unions’ successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona fide, arm’s-length 
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor policies, and not at the behest of or in 
combination with nonlabor groups, falls within the protection of the national labor 
policy and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act. 
Id. at 689-90. The consideration that determines whether an agreement falls under the antitrust 
exemption is the “relative impact on the product market and the interest of the union members,” 
not the form of the agreement. Id. at 690 n.5. Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Harlan and 
Justice Steward, concurred in the result, but dissented from Justice White’s opinion. In Justice 
Goldberg’s opinion, the hours during which meat could be sold were a “proprietary” matter in 
the exclusive control of the employer, not a legitimate concern for the union. Id. at 726. He 
would exempt any mandatory subject of bargaining from antitrust scrutiny. Id. Justice Douglas, 
joined by Justices Black and Clark, dissented on the ground that the agreement was a multi-
employer bargaining agreement to impose marketing hours on Jewel Tea through the threat of 
strike, a conspiracy based on Allen Bradley. Id. at 735-36. 
 50. Id. at 690. 
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D. The Judicially Created Exemption 
In 1975, the Court decided Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers 
& Steamfitters Local Union No. 100.51 The Court held that a union is 
protected by the Hutcheson statutory immunity when it acts in its 
own self-interest and not in combination with other non-labor 
groups.52  
E. Conclusion 
It took a century for the courts and congress to reach a 
compromise on antitrust exemptions. Congress passed three acts, the 
Clayton Act, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and the NLRA. Courts 
eventually allowed unions protection from antitrust law for unilateral 
action and formed the judicial, or non-statutory exemption, protecting 
the right to collectively bargain over wages and terms and conditions 
of employment.  
III. PHYSICIANS 
Physicians, in the past, worked under fee-for-service arrangements 
controlling their fees in every manner. When Americans demanded 
lower fees, managed care responded. MCOs have since become the 
bane of physicians’ lives. Because physicians are considered 
independent contractors, they cannot bargain collectively with 
MCOs. Physicians believe that MCOs have taken control of their 
patient practice and their pocketbooks. Accordingly, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) and physicians have adamantly 
supported the Health Care Act. However, some groups vehemently 
oppose the Health Care Act’s promulgation. 
A. History 
Before managed care became popular in the 1980s, physicians 
operated on a fee-for-service arrangement.53 During the 1960s and 
 
 51. 421 U.S. 616 (1975). 
 52. Id. at 622. 
 53. See The Quality Health Care Coalition Act: Hearings on H.R. 1304 Before the House 
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1970s, the rate of inflation for health care severely outpaced the 
general inflation rate.54 Thousands of Americans were uninsured.55 
When MCOs entered the market in the 1980s, the rate of inflation for 
health care costs dropped dramatically.56 Physicians are among the 
highest paid professionals, and over the last decade, their incomes 
increased seventy-seven percent to a median net income of $166,000 
in 1996.57 
B. Physician as Independent Contractors 
Under the “right to control test,” a worker is an independent 
contractor if the worker has control over the services performed.58 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 124 (1999) (statement of Donald A. Young, M.D., Chief 
Operating Officer and Medical Director of the HIAA). Under this arrangement, physicians were 
paid for the services they rendered to patients. Id. The more services they provided, the more 
they were paid. Id. Arguably, the impact on patients’ pocketbooks and the quality of care were 
irrelevant to the doctors. Id.  
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 125 (citing L. Levitt & J. Lundy, Trends and Indicators in the Changing Health 
Care Marketplace, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 65 (1998)). During this period, the median 
income of the average worker increased only 43% to a median net income of $28,480. See id. 
 58. See Lutsky, supra note 1, at 78 (citing Gary Enters., 300 NLRB 1111 (1990)); see also 
N. Am. Van Lines v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596 (1989); Glen Falls Newspapers, 303 NLRB 614 
(1991). The NLRB provided: 
The [right to control] test requires an evaluation of all the circumstances, but the extent 
of the actual supervision exercised by a putative employer over the means and manner 
of the workers’ performance is the most important element to be considered in 
determining whether or not one is dealing with independent contractors or employees. 
N. Am. Van Lines, 869 F.2d at 599. Other facts which courts consider are:  
1) whether individuals perform functions that are an essential part of the company’s 
normal operation or operate an independent business; 2) whether they have a 
permanent working arrangement with the Company which will ordinarily continue as 
long as performance is satisfactory; 3) whether they do business in the Company’s 
name with assistance and guidance from the Company’s personnel; 4) whether the 
agreement which contains the terms and conditions under which they operate is 
promulgated and changed unilaterally by the Company; 5) whether they account to the 
company for the funds they collect under a regular reporting procedure prescribed by 
the Company; 6) whether particular skills are required for the operations subject to the 
contract; 7) whether they have a proprietary interest in the work in which they are 
engaged; and 8) whether they have the opportunity to make decisions which involve 
risks taken by the independent [physician] which may result in profit or loss.  
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The traditional approach is to classify physicians as independent 
contractors.59 As independent contractors, they are prohibited from 
collective bargaining regarding fees and working conditions since 
they are not employees.60 For physicians to collaborate and 
 
Gary Enters., 300 NLRB at 1119. The facts of each case “must be individually considered, so 
physicians do not pass or fail as a group.” Capitol Parcel Delivery Co., 256 NLRB 302, 303 
(1981).  
 59. See Lutsky, supra note 1, at 67. However, physicians argue that the relationship they 
have with MCOs is one that makes the physician an employee. The physicians work for only 
one employer, the physicians collect a salary and bonuses tied to performance, and physicians’ 
terms of employment are dictated by the MCOs and are not negotiated. Id. at 64. A recent 
judicial decision found this argument convincing. See NLRB v. Thomas-Davis Medical Ctrs., 
P.C., 324 NLRB 15 (1997) (independent physicians considered employees when the 
physicians’ practices were under the complete control and discretion of the MCO); see also 
NLRB v. Health Care and Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (dissent arguing that 
acting in a supervisory capacity by directing other employees did not make physicians 
supervisors in a traditional sense since they did not have the authority to “hire, transfer, 
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employees”); 
NLRB v. Amerihealth, Inc., 326 NLRB No. 55 (1998) (allowing hearing for determination of 
whether physicians were controlled so much by an HMO that they were considered employees). 
But see AMA House of Delegates Report 41 of the Board of Trustees (A-97), Physicians and 
Unions, at 4 (“Before physicians can engage in collective bargaining under the labor exemption, 
the bargaining process must be part of a labor dispute. For there to be a labor dispute, the 
collective bargaining must concern the terms and conditions of employment.”). Traditionally, 
there is “no labor dispute for the purposes of the labor exemption if the physicians are 
independent contractors, entrepreneurs, or independent businesses.” Id.  
 60. See Lutsky, supra note 1, at 67. Only when physicians are deemed to be employees in 
an “employment relationship” involved in a genuine “labor dispute” will they be able to 
collectively bargain with employers. Traditionally, there has been “no labor dispute for 
purposes of the labor exemption if the physicians are independent contractors, entrepreneurs, or 
independent businesses.” Id. (citing AMA House of Delegates Report 41 of Trustees (A-97), 
Physicians and Unions, supra note 59, at 6). The exception to the traditional approach is that 
there are physicians who fall under the classification of employees: those physicians who are 
actual employees of a hospital. Id.; see also Serbaroli, supra note 4 (explaining that salaried 
doctors at public hospitals are generally recognized as employees). There is a debate over 
whether interns and residents are considered employees or students. Lutsky, supra note 1, at 73. 
As employees, they can take advantage of the antitrust exemption; as students they cannot take 
advantage of the exemption. Id.; see also NLRB v. Cedars Sinai Med. Ctrs. and Cedars-Sinai 
House Staff Ass’n, 223 NLRB 251 (1976) (“interns, residents and clinical fellows, although 
they posses certain employee characteristics, are primarily students . . . . We conclude that 
[they] are not ‘employees’ within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the [NLRA]”); see, e.g., 
NLRB v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps. and Clinics, 223 NLRB 1002 (1976); NLRB v. Kansas City 
Gen. Hosp., 225 NLRB 106 (1976). Recently, interns and residents successfully attacked the 
Cedars-Sinai decision. NLRB v. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 NLRB No. 30 (1999). The NLRB held 
that while interns, residents, and fellows are students, they are also employees under the NLRA. 
Id. at 26. 
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collectively bargain to set prices is a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act.61  
C. Physician Complaints 
Self-employed physicians currently subject to antitrust laws have 
two main concerns. First, physicians feel they have no control over 
patient care decisions.62 MCOs use a variety of methods to control 
the practice of physicians.63 Among these methods are: contractual 
measures designed to tie physician compensation to cost control 
measures; “gag clauses,” which restrict communication between the 
physician and patient on specified subjects; and “termination without 
cause” provisions, which allow the MCO to remove the physician 
from the plan.64 Physicians believe these contract provisions weaken 
the quality of care they may give patients.65 While physicians detest 
these provisions and the affect on their practices, physicians believe it 
is impossible to alter the provisions because MCOs often refuse to 
negotiate over the provisions and physicians do not have the 
economic leverage to force negotiations.66 
Physicians’ second concern is decreasing practice revenues as a 
result of managed care.67 Physicians blame low fees, refusal by 
MCOs to cover tests and procedures, and cost control measures for 
the decrease in practice revenues.68 
Increasingly, physicians are turning to unions to solve these 
problems.69 A union can act as a personal advocate, give advice to 
 
 61. NLRB v. Boston Med. Ctr., 330 NLRB No. 30 (1999). 
 62. Lutsky, supra note 1, at 87-88. 
 63. Deis, supra note 26, at 955. 
 64. Id.; see also Jennifer L. D’Isidori, Note, Stop Gagging Physicians!, 7 HEALTH 
MATRIX 187, 194-95 (1997) (providing the purpose of gag clauses). 
 65. See Deis, supra note 26, at 956; see also Ellen L. Luepke, White Coat, Blue Collar: 
Physician Unionization and Managed Care, 8 ANN. HEALTH L. 275, 277 (1999) (noting that 
radical physicians believe that MCOs have “taken over health care, destroyed the physician-
patient relationship and decreased quality of care, all for the purpose of realizing corporate 
profits”). 
 66. Deis, supra note 26, at 956. 
 67. Lutsky, supra note 1, at 87-88. 
 68. Id. at 87 (quoting Dr. Joseph Murphy, “[MCOs] are both negatively affecting the 
lifestyles of physicians and the quality of patient care . . . . Our input, prestige, and power 
within the health-care system continue to dwindle relentlessly”). 
 69. IPA Messenger Models’ Cause Concern, AMA Says, 158 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 376, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/17
p445 note Winfrey book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1999 461 
 
 
independent physicians on how to negotiate with providers, and assist 
in collection of reimbursements for work performed in good faith, but 
for which the insurance provider refuses to pay.70  
Physicians, however, may use alternatives to unions. One option 
is a “messenger model” where groups of independent physicians and 
hospitals form networks to negotiate with MCOs through third party 
messengers, often union representatives.71 Another option is 
 
376-77 (1998). Of the roughly 756,710 practicing doctors in the United States about 42,000 are 
currently members of labor unions and if the current restrictions on physicians are lifted, “a 
‘stampede’ of self-employed physicians in independent practice will rush to organize 
themselves in labor unions.” Id. at 376. However, physician unionization has been around for 
decades. It was at its peak in 1974 when over 55,000 physicians joined unions as a defense to 
malpractice, heavy government regulation, and a national health insurance plan. See Robert L. 
Lowes, Strength in Numbers: Could Doctor Unions Really Be the Answer?, MED. ECON. 114, 
114 (1998). When the Supreme Court declared that physician unions were subject to the 
Sherman Act, numerous suits were filed against the unions. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (holding tying arrangement is unlawful); Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (maximum fee agreements agreed upon by medical 
foundation members were per se unlawful); Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th Cir. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). 
 70. Lutsky, supra note 1, at 98. 
 71. See id. at 85. These messengers generally have better negotiation skills than 
physicians, but must be careful not to cross into illegality. The messengers may not share 
information between the individual physicians, but physicians benefit by the “strength in 
numbers” arrangement. Id. The messenger is also limited in the activities he may perform for 
the physician group. He may not make a decision for a physician or threaten a group boycott. 
Id. The network of independent physicians and hospitals must have “significant financial or 
clinical integration . . . if doctors are just trying to keep prices up and control the market, that’s 
illegal.” Harris Meyer, Look for the Union Label; Private Practice Physicians Considering 
Unionizing, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Dec. 5, 1996, at 69 (quoting Mark Whitener, deputy 
director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition). Recently, the FTC took a strong stance on the 
line crossing attempts of unions in third party messenger models. The FTC brought two actions 
based on Sherman Act violations. In United States v. Federation of Physicians and Dentists, 
Inc., 63 F. Supp.2d 475 (1999) and in United States v. Federation of Certified Surgeons and 
Specialists, Inc., 64 FR 5831-02 (1999), the FTC alleges price fixing despite the alleged use of 
the messenger model. Federation of Physicians and Dentists has not yet been resolved, 
however, the Federation of Certified Surgeons and Specialists agreed to a consent order that 
enjoined the union from collectively negotiating or acting as, or using, a messenger or agent 
with any payer on behalf of any Federation Physician that would enhance their bargaining 
power. The union may, however, communicate factual, accurate, and objective information 
about a proposed contract offer or terms. So far, the popularity of the messenger model is 
unclear. Although unions are pitching themselves as messengers and advocates by helping 
collect fees from third party payers, by opposing unwanted actions by state medical boards, and 
by lobbying against legislation harmful to doctors, the membership in at least one of these 
unions remained the same from 1995 to 1998. See Lowes, supra note 69, at 116. The president 
of the Federation of Certified Surgeons and Specialists, Joseph Diaco, M.D., believes that 
messenger models are not popular with physicians because the Department of Justice does not 
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integration, where physicians merge into groups that share significant 
financial risk.72 
D. The American Medical Association View 
The AMA believes that the Health Care Act is the solution to the 
physicians complaints because it will provide the physicians with 
greater leverage in negotiations with MCOs. The AMA asserts that 
health plan providers have too much leverage, while physicians have 
too little, and that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) have poor records of regulating health 
plan activity while restrictively enforcing antitrust policies against 
physicians.73  
E. Opponents of the Health Care Act and Other Obstacles 
The FTC, however, vehemently opposes the Health Care Act 
because of the possibility of abuse and increased costs to consumers 
and the government. The FTC also notes that the labor exemption 
 
allow physicians to discuss fees under the model. Molly Tschida, Killing the Messenger: Use of 
Third Parties in Negotiating Managed-Care Pacts under Fire, MOD. PHYSICIAN 2 (1999). He 
says, “[W]hy would you want a messenger system if you can’t discuss fees?” Id. 
 72. Federal law allows independent physicians to bargain collectively with MCOs if they 
share significant financial risk or seriously integrate their practices. See Lowes, supra note 69, 
at 116; see also JOHN J. FLYNN & HARRY FIRST, ANTITRUST STATUTES, TREATIES, 
REGULATIONS, GUIDELINES, POLICIES 408-28 (1999). Generally, the DOJ and FTC will not 
challenge non-exclusive joint ventures where the participants share substantial financial risk 
and constitute less than thirty percent of physicians in a specialty with active hospital staff 
privileges that practice in the relevant geographic market. Id. at 408. An exclusive physician 
joint venture may constitute only twenty percent of physicians in a specialty that practice in the 
relevant geographic market with active hospital staff privileges. Id. Exclusiveness is defined by 
the participants’ activities, not by the contractual relationship. Id. at 408. There are numerous 
indicia of non-exclusivity. See id. at 409.  
 73. In testimony to Congress in support of the Health Care Act, the AMA pointed out that 
the eighteen largest plan providers merged into only six. The Quality Health Care Coalition 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) 
(statement of E. Ratcliffe Anderson, Jr., M.D., Executive Vice President and Chief Executive 
Officer, AMA). Because of this increase in market concentration, neither patients nor 
physicians have any choice in plan providers. Id. In order to keep patients, physicians cannot 
afford to refuse to contract with plan providers. Id. The AMA alleges that federal agencies have 
“rarely, if ever, challenged an HMO merger,” but have aggressively pursued physicians and 
other providers under antitrust laws. Id. Further, contract terms provided by plan providers are 
often egregious and non-negotiable. Id. 
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already provides a remedy to physician employees, and this 
exemption was never intended to remedy the problems of which 
physicians complain.74 
The DOJ similarly opposes the Health Care Act as it would 
authorize nonemployees to negotiate collectively with MCOs over 
fees and to refuse to deal with plans refusing their demands.75 
Further, the DOJ sees no reason to differentiate doctors from other 
professionals who are unable to bargain collectively under current 
antitrust laws.76 Replying to the AMA’s attack on the lack of 
response by the DOJ regarding MCO activity, the DOJ discussed its 
close scrutiny of mergers and other activities by MCOs.77 Finally, the 
 
 74. Physicians have, in the past, collaborated to fix prices and to create more favorable 
reimbursement terms from third party payers in an unfair manner. The Quality Health Care 
Coalition Act: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
(1999) (statement of Robert Pitofsky, Chairman, FTC). Under the Health Care Act, it would be 
legal for these practices to continue and any “health care professional” could join in, including 
pharmacists. Id. It is not a remote possibility that a group of physicians would collaborate to 
demand an increase in fees while refusing to contract with any insurer who refuses to pay the 
rates. Id.; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 The result of the Health Care Act would be higher prescription rates, insurance premiums, 
and out of pocket expenses with a reduction in benefits for consumers. See id. The government 
may be forced to decrease services under Medicare and Medicaid or raise budgets to maintain 
current levels. See id.  
 The labor exemption was never intended to promote the quality of patient care as the 
proponents suggest the Health Care Act will do. See id. There are also alternatives to the Health 
Care Act, including the current ability of individual physicians to negotiate with plan providers 
and the ability of physicians to collectively confront the insurance providers about policies and 
present evidence to support their views. See id. 
 75. The Quality Health Care Coalition Act: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney 
General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice). 
 76. Id. Mr. Klein admonishes: 
There is no justification to accord special status to health care professionals under the 
antitrust laws, differentiating them from other professionals and independent 
contractors such as architects, engineers, or lawyers. It would be both unwise and 
harmful to consumers to grant [doctors] a special exemption. 
Id.  
 77. Klein discussed activities by Aetna and Prudential that scrutinized and found to be 
against antitrust laws without significant divestitures by Prudential. Once the necessary changes 
were made, and only once those changes were made did the DOJ approve the merger. Id. He 
also discussed the attempts by independent physicians to take joint action in order to increase 
their fees at the expense of the consumer. Id. (discussing Federation of Certified Surgeons and 
Specialists, 64 FR 5831 (1999), and Federation of Physicians and Dentists, 63 F. Supp.2d 475 
(1999)).  
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DOJ, like other opponents, believes the Health Care Act would 
significantly increase costs to consumers.78 
The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) also 
proclaimed its opposition to the Health Care Act in the hearing before 
the House Judiciary Committee.79 Citing as reasons, the ability of 
MCOs to reduce prices for consumers, the motive of physicians to 
increase their income, the past abuses of physicians, the danger of 
increased costs to consumers, the inapplicability of labor laws to 
physicians, and the current ability of physicians to bargain or discuss 
important matters with MCOs, the HIAA concluded that the Health 
Care Act is a problematic proposal with the potential to devastate the 
nation’s health care system.80 
 
 78. In Federation of Certified Surgeons and Specialists, Klein submitted that the 
competing physicians had successfully raised their fees by twenty to thirty percent before the 
DOJ began investigating. Fed’n of Certified Surgeons and Specialists, 64 FR 5831. Klein 
warned that the realities of economics and business suggest that, contrary to a proposition by 
Campbell, MCOs would not absorb these costs, but would instead pass them on to consumers 
and taxpayers. Id. 
 79. The Quality Health Care Coalition Act: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Donald A. Young, M.D., Chief 
Operating Officer and Medical Director of the Health Insurance Association of America). 
 80. Id.; see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text for Mr. Young’s discussion of 
abusive practices by physicians before MCOs reduced costs to consumers while maintaining a 
reasonable income for physicians. Mr. Young criticizes the motive of physicians for supporting 
the Health Care Act. He believes that considering the motivation of physicians to increase their 
profits, the concern for quality in patient care is merely a front. Id. He asserts that physicians do 
not need an exemption to collectively discuss issues regarding quality of care concerns under 
the FTC and DOJ guidelines. Id.; see also Department of Justice and Federal Trade 
Commission Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care, Section 4, Statement 
of Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Enforcement Policy on Providers’ 
Collective Provision of Non-Fee-Related Information to Purchasers of Health Care Services, at 
14 (1996). Further, many doctors belong to large health care groups that can exert enormous 
pressure on MCO’s. The Quality Health-Care Coalition Act: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 79. Young gives as examples the Hill Physicians 
Medical Group in California and American Oncology Resources. Hill Physicians has over 700 
primary care physicians, over 1,800 specialists, and 325,000 enrollees. American Oncology 
Resources has over 700 physicians and over 325 oncologists in treatment centers in 24 states. 
Id. 
 Mr. Young was extremely concerned that, while independent physicians would enjoy an 
antitrust exemption, they would not be subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB, would not be 
employees of a common employer, and would not be “bargaining units” as defined by federal 
labor law. Id. 
 An additional opponent of the Health Care Act, the Antitrust Coalition for Consumer 
Choice in Health Care voiced its opinion that the Health Care Act spelled disaster for American 
health care for the reasons set forth by other opponents. See The Quality Health Care Coalition 
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An author of a recent article suggests that giving physicians the 
ability to collectively bargain would not eliminate physicians’ 
concerns.81 He notes that only items of pecuniary interest would be 
mandatory bargaining subjects, while those subjects with significant 
impact on consumers, like quality of care, would be only permissive 
subjects.82 The risk that physicians would sacrifice patient care for 
improved compensation or benefits would, therefore, be significant.83 
By comparing issues over which physicians would bargain to 
traditional subjects of labor bargaining, the author deduced that labor 
law would not help protect patients or change physicians’ current 
situation.84 
Last year, Congress proposed two separate Patients’ “Bill of 
Rights” Acts.85 The bill passed by the House86 aims to deter abuses 
 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 1304 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) 
(statement of the Antitrust Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care). 
 81. Deis, supra note 26, at 964. “[The NLRA imposed duty to negotiate in good faith] 
appears to provide no guarantee that MCO’s would concede to any requests by a physician 
union or that any agreement would be reached.” Id. 
 82. Id. at 965-66 (citing David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate 
Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 707 (1990)); Michael J. 
Stapp, Ten Years After: A Legal Framework of Collective Bargaining in the Hospital Industry, 
2 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 63, 99-100 (1984). 
 83. Deis, supra note 26, at 988. “Assurance of quality patient care has been the battle cry 
of the physician-unionization movement, yet their mantra is a farce.” Id. 
 84. Salary, fee-for-service arrangements, capitation systems, bonus programs, cost 
sharing, and deselection clauses would be mandatory subjects of bargaining. Id. at 968-82. 
Patient coverage decisions, gag clauses, utilization review processes, and efficiency standards 
would probably be considered non-mandatory, or permissive subjects. Id. 
Labor law is simply not amenable to the protection of consumers’ interests. The 
procedural requirements of collective bargaining do not require MCO’s and physicians 
to concede to each other’s demands and do not even require that the parties reach an 
agreement. Although the bargaining requirement would prevent MCO’s from 
unilaterally changing a physician’s compensation or from discharging the physician, 
MCO’s would not be required to bargain over utilization review or gag clauses. 
Moreover, the regulatory board overseeing labor relations is relatively powerless to 
compel the parties to protect patients’ interests. The issues of greatest concern to 
patients would hinge upon the economic bargaining power of their physicians union 
and the willingness of their physicians to risk financial well being to protect patients 
interests . . . . If, through a miracle of generosity, collective bargaining agreements 
contain terms beneficial to patients’ interests, labor law provides no means for patients 
to enforce the terms of these agreements. 
Id. at 988. 
 85. In the 105th Congressional session, the House passed one version of the Patients’ Bill 
of Rights and the Senate passed a different version. Financial Services Reform is Top Insurance 
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and denials of service by MCOs and gives patients the right to sue 
health plans for damages caused by denials of benefits.87 The Senate 
version also intends to add protections for patients in group health 
plans, but is perceived as a less extensive bill and rejects the right to 
sue provision.88 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH CARE ACT AND PROPOSAL 
Passage of the Health Care Act would not be an effective or wise 
action by Congress. Not only does a labor exemption for physicians 
contravene the fundamental theories behind antitrust and labor law, it 
also does not cure physicians’ complaints.  
Essentially, the non-statutory labor exemption allows employees 
to bargain collectively with employers over pay and working 
conditions.89 The purpose of the labor exemption is to ensure that 
employers treat workers fairly.90 The exemption is intended to apply 
only to employees and employers.91 However, physicians are 
 
Story of 1999, BESTWIRE, Dec. 27, 1999, at 1. A conference committee was appointed to 
reconcile the differences. Paul Bradley, Robb Promises Stronger Pursuit of Patient Rights, 
RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 1999, at B-4. It is expected that in the 106th session, the 
House and Senate will compromise on the Health Care Act. See id. 
 86. The Patient Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 4250, sponsored by Reps. John D. Dingell, 
Democrat-Michigan, Charlie Norwood, Republican-Georgia, and Greg Ganske, Republican-
Iowa. H.R. 1304 was supported by numerous House Republicans despite “the opposition of the 
managed care industry, employer groups, and the House GOP leadership.” Spencer Rich, Dems 
Ready to Pounce Over Patients’ Rights, 32 No.4 NAT’L J. 242 (2000).  
 87. For a description of allegedly abusive practices of MCOs, see supra notes 65-66 and 
accompanying text. In addition to abusive practices directed toward physicians, individuals 
complained that they were denied services by MCOs that their physician felt were necessary to 
their health. See generally Bradley, supra note 85, at B-4 (describing patient complaints that an 
HMO prevented a young boy from obtaining access to a specialist to treat “persistent ear 
infections” that were unresponsive to antibiotics and a patient complaint that she was denied 
access to so-called “experimental” treatment for a rare-form of cancer). 
 This provision sparked a heated debate due to concerns that it will substantially raise prices 
for health care coverage. Republicans Now Embrace the Patients Bill of Rights with a New 
Urgency (National Public Radio broadcast, Morning Edition, Jan. 24, 2000). Summarizing the 
head of the American Association of Health Plans, Karen Ignagni, the Rovner reported that if 
more lawsuits are allowed, “costs will rise so much that employers will stop providing health 
coverage altogether.” Id. 
 88. Rich, supra note 86. 
 89. See supra text accompanying note 52. 
 90. See supra text accompanying note 25; supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 91. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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inherently considered independent contractors, unless they work for a 
hospital.92 
The Health Care Act allows physicians who are not employees to 
collaborate and dictate pricing to insurance providers.93 It does not 
grant a “laborer” or an “employee” the ability to improve his working 
condition, but allows educated, independent physicians to dictate, not 
fair wages, but increased profits.94 Physicians already make a fair 
wage and their median income increased at more than twice the rate 
of other workers.95 
Neither the labor exemption, nor the baseball exemption adversely 
affects anyone outside of the employer/employee relationship. 
Generally, laborers produce goods that consumers may choose to 
purchase or refuse to purchase at their discretion. Similarly, baseball 
is an entertainment sport that consumers may choose to attend or 
refuse to attend. However, the Health Care Act and the exemption it 
creates could have, potentially, a great impact on the public at large. 
The Health Care Act creates an antitrust exemption for a product that 
consumers have little discretion in purchasing. All consumers 
confront the need for health care at some point in their lives. The 
Health Care Act would leave consumers with little choice when they 
seek care: consumers must either pay the prices dictated by the 
physician or risk their health by refusing to pay. 
The past reluctance of both the judiciary and the legislature to 
grant exemptions demonstrates the hesitance to carry the antitrust 
exemptions too far.96 Once a doctor is able to collectively negotiate, 
thereby effectively creating a monopoly in his or her market, all 
professionals will demand the same exemption. Lawyers could 
collude to raise fees for legal services. Accountants could organize to 
charge higher rates to businesses and individuals for accounting 
services. This scenario is the antipathy of the intention of Congress in 
creating the antitrust laws. No group should be able to collude to 
raise prices in the market under the antitrust laws, but the Health Care 
 
 92. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra notes 6, 81-84 and accompanying text. 
 94. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra notes 10-52 and accompanying text. 
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Act allows just that result. 
Outside the realm of the antitrust exemptions, the explanation for 
the popularity of managed care is that doctors were charging more 
than patients could afford.97 This inability to pay resulted in a large 
number of Americans without physician care.98 Doctors abused their 
privilege in the past and there is no indication that they will not do so 
now.99 In fact, physicians admit that managed care caused a decrease 
in profits.100 The Health Care Act will allow doctors to increase 
profits, thereby padding their pockets further. At an increase in 
median wage over thirty percent than that of the average worker, 
physicians are not to be pitied.101  
Further, if physicians are to have an increase in profits, health care 
costs must increase as well.102 It is unrealistic to think that MCOs will 
not pass along any additional costs to the public.103 If Congress 
passes the Health Care Act, it is likely that health care will return to 
the environment of the 1970s when many Americans could not afford 
health care. 
Finally, there are alternatives to granting physicians an exemption 
that allow them more leverage in negotiations and still provide 
quality health care. First, the executive branch can more closely 
monitor practices of plan providers to ensure that unfair conditions 
are not being pushed onto doctors or unsuspecting patients.104 The 
DOJ acknowledges this duty.105 
Second, although there are many independent physicians who 
practice in small groups, many practice in large groups.106 It is absurd 
to presume that these physicians have no leverage over MCOs. Even 
physicians in small groups currently have the ability to negotiate 
collectively through several techniques. First, physicians can work 
 
 97. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
 98. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 102. See supra notes 74, 78, 80 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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for hospitals, thereby becoming employees.107 Second, physicians can 
form joint ventures.108 Doctors in joint ventures can negotiate 
together against the MCOs. Third, in what is known as the 
“messenger model,” a group of physicians may share risk and form 
networks with a third party “messenger” to negotiate with the 
insurer.109 These three methods each allow physicians greater 
leverage in negotiations with insurance providers. 
If doctors are legitimately concerned with the quality of patient 
care, as the Health Care Act suggests, the enactment of a Patient Bill 
of Rights remedies this concern by giving patients the ability to 
demand certain options from the MCOs and making patient care a 
choice of the patient and the doctor.110 The Patient Bill of Rights is a 
proper way to eliminate the concerns that physicians claim to have 
over patient care without delving into an area of law that the judiciary 
and the legislature have been hesitant to alter. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It took the legislature and the judiciary a century to develop the 
application of antitrust laws to labor and to carve out limited 
exemptions from the law. As professional independent contractors, 
Physicians have been subject to these antitrust laws since the 
promulgation of the Sherman Act. Now, physicians argue that the 
entrance of MCOs into health care cause such burdens on physicians 
that they should now be afforded an antitrust exemption. Physicians, 
however, have numerous other methods of negotiating with MCOs. 
Nevertheless, an antitrust exemption would not provide the cure 
physicians claim to seek. While it took years to create the labor laws, 
it could take only the signing of the Health Care Act to unravel them. 
 
 107. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 110. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text. 
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